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Organizations exist because they provide additional production gains, in compar-
ison to horizontal ways of allocating resources, such as markets [1], and the open
source movement is deemed to be a new kind of peer-production organization some-
how in between hierarchically organized firms and markets [2]. However, to strive
as a new kind of organization, open source must provide production gains, which in
turn should be measurable. The open source movement is particularly interesting to
study for this reason. Here, we confront and discuss two contrasting views, which
were reported in the literature recently. On the one hand, Sornette et al. [3] un-
covered a superlinear production mechanism, which quantifies Aristotle adage: “the
whole is more than the sum of its parts”. On the other hand, Scholtes et al. [4] found
opposite results, and referred to Maximilien Ringelmann, a French agricultural en-
gineer (1861-1931), who discovered the tendency for individual members of a group
to become increasingly less productive as the size of their group increases [5]. Since
Ringelmann, the topic of collective intelligence has interested numbers of researchers
in social sciences and social psychology [6], as well as practitioners in management
aiming at improving the performance of their team [7]. In most research and practice
case studies, the Ringelmann effect has been found to hold, while, in contrast, the
superlinear effect found by Sornette et al.is novel and may challenge common wisdom
[3]. Here, we compare these two theories, weigh their strengths and weaknesses, and
discuss how they have been tested with empirical data. We find that they may not
contradict each other as much as was claimed by Scholtes et al. [4].
2I. INTRODUCTION
In psychology (Gestalt theory [8]), biology (brain functions [9], ecological networks [10]),
physics (spontaneous symmetry breaking [11] and the “more is different” concept [12]),
and in economics [13, 14], the famous adage by Aristotle “the whole is more than the sum
of its parts” has inspired research in complexity science, in particular regarding emerging
behaviors in nature and society [15, 16]. Indeed, the raison d’eˆtre of societies is the prospect
that people will achieve more together, yet at some individual alienation costs [17]. For a
society to strive, these alienation costs should overall be smaller than the benefits a society
can bring to its members. Ideally, fair distribution of benefits should be organized through
institutions [18] that implement robust mechanisms to enforce cooperation [19, 20].
One special instance of a society is the firm. A firm is an organization devoted to
production, which is born from the internalization of transaction costs associated with
gathering production resources, in particular human resources: at some point it is less
costly to permanently hire an individual whose skills are needed often than sourcing them
repeatedly on a market [1]. Hence, the employee enters a permanent contractual relation
and thus, an organizational structure at some alienation costs (less freedom to contract
with other parties).
The open source movement operates in a slightly different fashion: peer-production
[2] prescribes that participants to an open source project mainly obey two rules : (i)
task self-selection and (ii) peer-review. In a nutshell, contribution (i.e., production)
enforcement mechanisms are very loose, neither relying on hierarchical organization nor
market mechanisms and there is no clear counterpart to contributions in open source
development. The lack of explicit organization rules in open source has generated much
attention in management science [21, 22], complex systems and network dynamics [23], law
and economics [24, 25], with one overarching question being how self-organized communities
gather and, moreover, produce efficiently together in absence of organizational rules clearly
tied to incentives [26].
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3The open source movement gathers people with heterogeneous incentives, ranging
from hedonism to paid jobs [26]. It is therefore difficult to measure the implications of
individual, and of collective intelligence and coordination, on the production of source
code. In particular, there is the question of how cumulative innovation emerges from
self-selected contributions and peer-review, which on average make software more robust
and help the emergence of new functionalities. Measuring production and productivity of
collective intelligence may be a significant addition to the debate, and attempts to measure
productivity of software developers is nearly as old as the software industry [27], with
several models developed to measure the efficiency of software programmers, yet with the
assumption that programmers work in a corporate environment, which is usually highly
scheduled.
The bottom-up and collective intelligence aspects of production have been much less cov-
ered, in open source and more generally, in open collaboration [28]. Dealing with groups
such as firms and production units, management science also aims to understand when and
how a group can produce more than the sum of its individual contributions, and to design
ways to improve team performance [29–32], through the mechanism of complementarity in
organization [33, 34] and innovations [35]. Because most activities in our modern environ-
ment require coordination and collaborative actions within groups of widely varying sizes,
it is the fundamental aspiration of any manager, be it in the public or private sector, to
find and master the determinants of enhanced productivity. Since Ringelmann, the topic
of collective intelligence has interested numbers of researchers in social sciences and social
psychology [6], as well as practitioners in management aiming at improving the performance
of their team [7].
Despite their conflicting views, the contributions by Sornette et al. [3] and Scholtes et
al. [4] provide key insights on that matter, in particular, yet not limited to, open source
development. We focus on these two papers in particular because Scholtes et al. [4] chal-
lenged evidence brought forth by Sornette et al. [3], creating confusion or perhaps even
worse the sentiment that the superlinear productivity law is stillborn, having been killed
just out of its academic womb. In the remaining of this paper, we describe and compare
the two approaches (Section II), then discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each approach
4(Section III), and conclude (Section IV).
II. PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES FOR OPEN SOURCE
SOFTWARE
Here, we expose the two contrasting perspectives taken by Scholtes et al. [4] on the one
hand, and by Sornette et al. [3] on the other hand.
A. The Ringelmann effect in software engineering
There is a common wisdom supported by a vast majority of studies, which tend to show
that teams of software developers become less productive as they get bigger. In empirical
software engineering, this phenomenon is known as the Brooks law of software project
management, which states that “adding manpower to a late software project makes it later”
[27]. The identified cause for the Brooks’ law is the increasing coordination costs involved
as teams get larger. In social psychology, this phenomenon is also known as the Ringelmann
effect, in reference to Maximilien Ringelmann, a French agricultural engineer (1861-1931)
who discovered the tendency for individual members of a group to become increasingly less
productive as the size of their group increases [5].
Scholtes et al. [4] performed a study using a dataset of 58 open source software (OSS)
projects, which amount in total to more than 580,000 commits contributed by more
than 30,000 developers. Their study indeed finds that the Ringelmann effect seems to
hold on average. Here is the way they proceeded for their study. While in structured
organizations, a team can be easily defined and measured, a team in OSS projects is more
complicated. Indeed, Scholtes et al. [4] reported that 40% of contributions to OSS projects
(i.e., commits) were made by one-time contributors. Researchers have identified different
circles of contributors from a core team (producing up to 90% of the source code), to
less involved contributors, to one-shot contributors, and finally, to lurkers, who follow the
advancement of a project without contributing to the source code, and yet participating
e.g., on the mailing list or posting issues [36]. The heterogeneous, distributed, and uneven
proportion of contributions makes the study of OSS project organizations complicated,
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OSS Projects studied 56 164
Number of Contributors 30, 845 15, 650
Number of Commits 581, 353 8, 220, 673
Project sampling • > 1 year of activity
• > 50 active developers
• ⊂ 100 most popular
projects in GitHub
Random sampling : Power
law distribution found
Pr(size > S) ∼ 1/S1.4 with
S the number of contributors
TABLE I: Comparison of datasets used by Scholtes et al, and Sornette et al.
particularly across projects, themselves of heterogeneous nature.
Scholtes et al. provided a dynamic formulation of what a team is, considering that a
developer, who has not contributed after 295 days has 10% chance to further contribute.
Therefore, they chose a window of 295 days to define a team size at time t, which is the
count of contributors who have committed at least once in the last 295 days. The output
must also be measured. Various measures of source code production have been developed
to account for contribution effort [37, 38]. Scholtes et al. decided to focus on quantifying
changes, as measured by the edit distance (also called the Levenshtein distance [39]), i.e.,
the minimum number of bytes one has to permute/add/delete to compare between a version
of the source code and a committed update. Scholtes et al. used averaged contributions over
time windows of 7 days (rationalized by the fact that in 90% of the cases, two consecutive
commits occur within this time window).
Scholtes et al. first measured the output (i.e., number of commits and contributions as
defined by edit distance over the last 7 days) as a function of the input (i.e., active developers
within the same 7 days window at time t). They found that, when the number of developers
increase, the mean contribution per developer decreases. Moreover, when considering mean
contribution per active developer as a function of team size (i.e., developers active in the last
6295 days), the results show the same negative scaling function [for commits : ∼ team−0.24
(p < 0.001 and r2 = 0.16) and for contributions ∼ team−0.36 (p < 0.001 and r2 = 0.08),
obtained by MM-estimation]. The authors highlight the particularly low r2 in both case,
reflecting the high variability of their average measures, and as such, they conclude that it
is impossible to make robust predictions from these scaling laws. Considering the output as
a function of team size (here, the input is considered as the amount of resources available,
i.e., contributors who have roughly more than a 10% chance to contribute), again negative
scaling properties are found [for commits : team−0.75 (p < 0.001 and r2 = 0.44) and for
contributions : team−0.86 (p < 0.001 and r2 = 0.25), obtained by MM-estimation].
As a consequence, Scholtes et al. concluded that “OSS communities are indeed no
magical exception from the basic economics of collaborative software engineering”, and they
further attempted to substantiate the observed decreasing return on scale, considering two
commonly accepted reasons for the Ringelmann effect : (i) free-loading and (ii) coordination
costs. They concentrated on the latter because there is a substantial body of evidence
and research work on coordination in software engineering. Although the authors did not
mention it, it is indeed hard, if not impossible, to define free-loading when contributors
are actually not compelled to contribute (following the general rules of peer-production
applicable in OSS). To assess coordination effort and its effects on productivity, Scholtes
et al. borrowed from Cataldo et al. [40] and computed the co-edition directed network for
all developers (direction stands for chronological influence) as a function of time (i.e., time
windows of 7 days), with a distinction between out-degree kout (i.e., one developer has to
build on changes by kout other developers) and in-degree kin (i.e., kin developers must build
on changes by one developer). Scholtes et al. considered first the mean out-degree as a
function of the size of the coordination network [69]. The mean out-degree and the size of
the coordination network seem to be positively correlated, but it is not clear what we can
learn from this result (Figure 11 in Scholtes et al. [4]; not discussed in the paper). Finally,
Scholtes et al. considered mean out-degree as a function of the negative productivity
scaling exponent described above. They found that projects with “strongly negative and
significant slopes for the scaling of productivity also exhibit pronouncedly positive scaling
exponents for the growth of the mean (weighted) out-degree” (Figure 12 in Scholtes et al. [4]).
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Activity window 7 days 5 days
Team definition s := at least one contribution in
last 295 days
all developers
Active developers within 7 days windows c (within 5 days windows)
Primary production
measure
commit contributions (Levenshtein
distance between commits)
R := number of commits
Productivity n := mean number of commits;
c := mean number of commit
contributions per active developer
number of commits R
performed by c active
developers
Productivity scaling
properties
n ∼ sα0 with α0 ≈ −0.24
c ∼ sα1 with α1 ≈ −0.36
R ∼ cβ with βˆ ≈ 4/3
TABLE II: Comparison of definitions and results by Scholtes et al., and Sornette et al. Comparing
both approach, we observe that resorting to averaging (Scholtes et al.) leads to tremendously
different results, compared to a direct measure of production per developer (Sornette et al.).
Based on these results, Scholtes et al. asserted that OSS projects exhibit dis-economies
of scale in production as a function of team size, and hence, sub-linear productivity. They
rejected the evidence that “the whole is more than the sum of its parts” evidenced by the
superlinear productivity shown by Sornette et al. [3].
B. The Aristotle effect perspective
In contrast to the previous section, by analyzing 164 open source software (OSS) projects
of broadly distributed sizes ranging from 5 to 1,678 contributors, Sornette et al. [3] found
that contribution activity R, defined in terms of number of commits, within a time window
of 5 days, is a superlinear function R ∼ cβ of the number of active developers c during the
same period. The superlinear exponent is on average βˆ ≈ 4/3, over all projects studied,
with a rather large variability with βˆ ranging from 1 to 3. They found that βˆ tends to
8decrease with the number of contributors in the five day window, fluctuating around 1 or
less for more than 30 to 50 contributors. Moreover, as reported in Sornette et al. [3], the
distribution of total number of developers per project is heavy-tailed, i.e., with many small
projects and a few very large ones.
Sornette et al. explored two possible mechanisms generating the observed superlinear
phenomenon : (i) an interaction-based mechanism (including interactions leading to a phase
transition or to a super-radiance phenomenon [41]) and (ii) a large-deviation mechanism,
based on the fact that, in the presence of a heavy-tailed distribution of contributors per
project, many developers contribute just few commits while a minority contribute most of
the commits; then, the larger the group size, the more likely it is for a large contributor
to be present, leading to the superlinearity phenomenon. The observation that a few
developers dominate the overall contribution is well-known in OSS, and is also reported
by Scholtes et al. Sornette et al. did not attempt to distinguish which one of these two
mechanisms might be at work. They however considered that both the interaction-based
and the large deviations mechanisms can be captured together by a generic cascade process,
which has been found to be well described by self-excited Hawkes conditional Poisson
processes [42], in particular for human dynamics [43–47], taking into account the specifics
of human timing [48].
The Hawkes process is defined by the conditional point process intensity I(t) of events
(commits) given by
I(t) = λ(t) +
∑
i|tt<t
fiφ(t− ti) , (1)
where {ti, i = 1, 2, ...} are the timestamps of past commits, λ(t) is the spontaneous exoge-
nous rate of commits, fi is the fertility of commit i that quantifies the number of commits
(of first generation) that it can potentially trigger directly, and φ(t − ti) is the memory
kernel, whose integral is normalized to 1, which weights how much past commit activities
influence future ones. According to (1), the number of commits contributed between time
t and t + dt results from two sources: (i) an exogenous source λ(t)dt representing the
spontaneous commits not related to previous commits; (ii) an endogenous term represented
by the sum over all commits that were made prior to t, and which are susceptible to trigger
9future commits. The class of Hawkes models can be mapped onto the general class of
branching processes [49]. The statistical average fertility 〈fi〉 defines the branching ratio
n, which is the key parameter. For n < 1, n = 1 and n > 1, the process is respectively
sub-critical, critical and super-critical [50, 51]. Interpreting a cluster or connected cascade
in a given branching process of triggered contributions as the burst of production in a
group of developers, the distribution of contributions is thus mapped onto that of triggered
cluster sizes [52].
Sornette et al. found and empirically validated that, at criticality, there is a relationship
between the power law tail distribution (with exponent γ ≈ 1.5) of activity per contributors
per time bin of 5 days, the power law tail distribution of cluster size, which is equivalent to
the production R per contributor with renormalized exponent µ = 1/γ and the superlinear
scaling exponent β = γ = 1/γ. However, as already mentioned, Sornette et al. found that
the superlinear scaling exponent β tends to decrease as a function of the total number of
contributors in an OSS project. Likewise, the frequency of productive bursts is reduced for
larger projects, suggesting that large projects bear additional coordination costs.
III. ARISTOTLE VERSUS RINGELMANN ?
Before considering the fundamental differences between the two approaches presented
here, and their validity, we shall highlight some results, which to some extent bear
resemblance. Sornette et al. found that large projects tend to exhibit less powerful and
less frequent superlinear productive bursts. This result may look similar to the findings
by Scholtes et al., who studied only large projects. However, Sornette et al. do not say
that there are dis-economies of scale, but rather that economies of scales appear to be
weaker. Similarly to the co-edition directed network model developed by Scholtes et al.,
the self-excited Hawkes conditional Poisson process measures how past commits influence
future commits. It does so in a way that incorporates the influence all past events, while
the network approach by Scholtes et al. relies only on 7-day contribution windows. In other
words, Scholtes et al. considered that, in order to be dependent (and bear coordination
costs between each other), two commits must occur within the same time window. The
network approach, taking into account who changed which file, brings more information
10
regarding how contributions relate to each other. It is also interesting to note the closeness
of the short- and long-term time windows used in the two studies : 7 and 295 days for
Scholtes et al. versus 5 and 250 days for Sornette et al. While Scholtes et al. provide a
justification, Sornette et al. are only concerned with robustness and check that the same
results are obtained by varying the short-term window. In Sornette et al., no rationale is
provided for the long-term window.
Beyond these resemblance and arguably a common research question, nearly every other
aspects differ in the two studies: the chosen approach, the definitions of productivity, and
the data used. This raises a number of questions on the main claim by Scholtes et al. that
Sornette et al. were wrong about the superlinear productive bursts [4]. In the following,
we thus highlight and discuss these methodological divergences. Moreover, we discuss the
approach chosen by Scholtes et al. to take on the results by Sornette et al, in an era that
promotes open science and, most importantly, reproducibility of scientific results.
A. Productivity & Team Size
We start by a fundamental conceptual remark that illuminates one key difference
between the approach of Scholtes et al. [4] and the one by Sornette et al. [3]. Scholtes et
al. consider production in the mean, using as metric the average output per team member
(Introduction, 2nd paragraph, line 3), and argue that it increases when synergy effects are
present and decrease due to communication and coordination overhead (which surges with
larger teams). In contrast, Sornette et al. argued and demonstrated that using an average
output is misleading in the presence of highly bursty dynamics characterized by power law
tail distributions with small tail exponents. This empirical fact is also cited by Scholtes et
al. and well-documented in the open source software production literature and for other
open collaboration projects, such as wikis and Wikipedia [53–56]. In open collaboration,
a few contributors account for a majority of performed work, whether counted in lines of
code, commits, files modified, and so on. This is one of the features associated with the fact
that the distribution of contributions, counted in commits or in lines of codes, possesses a
power law tail of the form P (X > x) ∼ 1/xµ with µ < 1 [3]. Such distributions are wild
[57] in the sense that their two first statistical moments (mean and variance) are undefined
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and diverge as the sample grows. For such heavy-tail distributions, reasoning in mean is
fundamentally erroneous, as Scholtes et al. could indeed experience when trying to perform
predictions (c.f., Section 4.1 in [4]). For a finite number n of developers in the project,
it is easy to show that the average production scales as ∼ n1/µ for µ < 1 and ∼ n for
µ ≥ 1. Defining productivity as the ratio of the total production by the number n of team
members, this shows that productivity scales as ∼ n
1/µ
n
= n
1
µ
−1 for µ < 1 and is constant for
µ ≥ 1. This latter case is the null hypothesis of an approximate constant output per team
member. Superlinear production is quantified by µ < 1, leading to a growing productivity
per team member, the larger the team. Searching for a superlinear productivity is different
from seeking a superlinear production, the former requiring 1
µ
− 1 > 1, i.e., µ < 1/2, while
the later just needs µ < 1. In their dataset of 164 projects, Sornette et al. found that only
four projects are characterized by µ < 0.5 (while most obey µ < 1). Scholtes et al. have
used a much smaller dataset of 58 projects, which implies a ≈ 0.8% chance to find one
project for which the average productivity scales superlinearly with team size.
More generally, the definition of productivity needs to be carefully addressed. Indeed,
an open source software community does not come into being fully grown. It starts
rather small and then grows progressively – one could say organically – with the project.
When growing, the community bears increasing communication and coordination costs as
pointed out by Scholtes et al. While recognizing the importance of different team sizes,
Scholtes et al., picked projects meeting the following criteria: (i) at least one year of
activity, (ii) 50 different active developers, and (iii) being among the 100 most popular
projects, as measured by the number of forks on GitHub, a leading online service for
open source software production. In contrast, Sornette et al. chose a representative
sample of the open source ecosystem with 134 projects with less than 50 developers
and 30 projects with more than 50 developers (with a minimum of 5 developers). The
representative sampling of projects (see Figure 1 in [3]) showed that the superlinear
production is usually valid only for projects of sizes no more than 30 to 50 members who
are active at a given time. Sornette et al. found statistically significant evidence that
the superlinear production tends to fade away to just linear production (i.e., constant
productivity per developer) for projects with more than 50 developers (see Figure 8 in [3]).
In other words, the sample selection made by Scholtes et al. seems heavily biased towards
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large projects, which represent the few large (presumably older) projects and are indeed
exposed to more communication and coordination costs, and also exhibit less synergy effects.
More specifically, Scholtes et al. defined a team as the set of developers who are active
at least once within a time window of 295 days, determined by the 90th quantile of the
distribution of times between two consecutive commits by the same person. This definition
excludes developers with a unique contribution, who nevertheless account for 40% of all
contributions, as reported by Scholtes et al. in Section 3.2 of [4] (end of second paragraph).
In line with our above remarks concerning the heavy-tailed distribution of contribution
sizes, this definition amounts to throw away the baby with the bath, since it is fundamentally
ill-suited to account for the fact that a few, often most senior, developers may not contribute
for years in between two commits (see Figure 2 in [58]), while at the same time they may
account for most of the contribution production. The definition of contributors proposed
by Scholtes et al. is thus biased with respect to the special nature of the open source
software community, which is, almost by essence, different from a corporate organization,
as documented in a number of management science articles (see e.g., [26] and references
therein).
Yet, productivity may be defined in a variety of ways, each with their advantages and
shortcomings. Scholtes et al. considered productivity as production per active developers
among a team (defined as an aggregate of working developers in large – 295 days – time
windows), while Sornette et al. considered productivity as production per developer and
per time unit (i.e., over a short time period of 5 days). Even though not perfect, the latter
definition is more fine-grained than the one proposed by Scholtes et al., and precisely allows
capturing the subtle highly non-linear bursts of activity reported in [3], which could not
be observed by averaging developer engagement (over a team aggregate and over time).
In essence, two visions oppose each other: Scholtes et al. adopted a software engineering
perspective, which takes roots in the necessity to measure the effort and productivity by
software developers in a competitive industry. Because of the complexity of information
systems, and the importance of outsourcing, the software development industry may suffer
from the principal-agent problem [59] and hence, may require controlling. The software
engineering perspective is reflected by the sampling of only large projects (suggesting
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that smaller projects are not really worth studying), and by the definition of active
contributors and teams, which ignores 40% of the contributors. On the contrary, Sornette
et al. considered the OSS ecosystem with no filter, taking a more general approach in
project sampling, in the definition of contributions, and in theory elaboration and validation.
B. Commits & superlinear scaling
Productivity is the ratio of an output and an input. So far, we have mainly discussed
the developer input, i.e., the human capital. Scholtes et al. raised concerns about the
output, and claimed that the number of commits is an erroneous measure of production.
For that, they bring forth the following argument: the total number of commits contributed
by n developers active in a given time period cannot – by definition – be less than n, which is
why the total number of commits must scale at least linearly with team size. This apparently
common-sensical claim is incorrect as we demonstrate here. Let us consider n developers.
The largest contributor makes N commits (resp. lines of code). The second one contributes
N/2α commits. The third one contributes N/3α commits, and the n-th one contributes
N/nα commits. If 0 < α < 1 and n and N are such that N/nα > 1 (i.e., n 6 N1/α), then
the total number of commits contributed by n developers is given by
S(n) =
N
1α
+
N
2α
+
N
3α
+ · · ·+
N
jα
+ · · ·+
N
nα
∼ N · n1−α. (2)
Thus, in this example, the total contributions of these developers grow sub-linearly as a
function of group size n, with exponent 1 − α. Let us illustrate this demonstration by a
numerical example, showing that the sublinear effect is clearly visible even for small team
sizes. Let us assume that N = 10 and α = 1/2. For n = 5 developers, the total number of
commits is 32. For n = 25, the total contribution is equal to 86 commits, which is 2.7 times
that for the team of 5 developers (and not 5 times more). Note that for the team of 25
developers, the first contributor makes 10 commits and the last one contributes 2 commits.
We believe Scholtes et al. made a very common confusion between absolute numbers and
scaling properties. More generally, in the field of fractals, this error is also often found in
the literature that confuses the fact that the fractal dimension (here, the scaling exponent)
tells nothing (or very little) about the density (here, the number of commits per developer).
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Dismissing commits as a measure of production, Scholtes et al. used the Levenshtein edit
distance [39] of source code changes between two consecutive commits (i.e., so-called diffs).
The Levenshtein edit distance counts the number of permutations, additions and deletions
of characters necessary to match two different strings. Using the Levenshtein edit distance
is without doubt more detailed, but it is not sufficient to dismiss commits. Even though
they have not used the Levenshtein edit distance, Sornette et al. showed that superlinear
scaling production holds as well for lines of code (see Figure 3 in [3]), up to an additional
scaling factor that defines the relation between commits and lines of code. In order to
properly dismiss commits as a measure of contribution, Scholtes et al. may have wanted to
show that there is no relation between commits and their contribution metric, for which
there is no clear consensus in the scientific literature. The Levenshtein distance is more
detailed than commits, but may not necessarily contain additional relevant information.
Moreover, at a qualitative level, we should stress that using the more detailed Levenshtein
edit distance is not without its own problems. One may indeed argue that changing one
character or a single line of code in a piece of software, while quantified as minor by
the Levenshtein distance, could be in some cases a tremendous output reflecting a major
commitment in terms of human capital (think e.g., of a small edit correcting a security
vulnerability) [60–62]. We suggest that a truly faithful measure of input would be the time
effectively spent in front of a computer by a contributor in order to achieve a task for the
focal open source software project. Unfortunately, this information is not available to open
source software researchers and, even if it would be available, one could endlessly debate
on a broad (resp. narrow) definition of time consumption, and whether the coffee break
and the ping-pong sessions are actually parts of the production time: nearly all Silicon
Valley software companies would include this time as truly productive time. Another way
of proceeding would be to use a robust approach to attribute value to each contribution
instead of assuming value. Such an approach to attribute value to contributions has been
previously proposed by Maillart et Sornette [63]. In more conditioned environments, other
ways to attribute contribution value to individuals engaged in collective intelligence have
been tested and studied [64].
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C. From Aristotle to Ringelmann : a missed opportunity for reproducible science ?
Open science is nowadays highly promoted to ensure reproducibility of scientific results,
and to encourage research groups to “debug” and build upon each other works [66, 67]. The
open science movement is inspired by the open source software movement, best summarized
by the seminal adage : Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow [65]. The authors
of the paper From Aristotle to Ringelmann: a large scale analysis of team productivity
and coordination in Open Source Software projects are (or were) members of the Chair
of Systems Design. The Chair of Systems Design has been known to be a pioneering
research group at ETH Zurich, advocating the use of open source software and contributing
significantly to the open access movement. Sornette et al. published in PlosOne, which the
first and leading open access scientific journal. Along with the paper, they submitted and
shared the data they used for their study. Scholtes et al. clearly framed their paper as a
response to Sornette et al. (“From Aristotle to Ringelmann” in the title), and they claimed
that the results published by Sornette et al. do not hold. The claim by Scholtes et al. is
at best misleading as they did not bind to elementary principles of science reproducibility.
First, they neither used the same data nor detailed the potential implications of using
a different dataset. Second, they neither invalidated the method by Sornette et al. nor
compared thoroughly both approaches, with their pros and cons, as we have done above.
Third and foremost, they did not bring compelling arguments for changing the assumptions
underlying the analyses. These limitations deeply undermine their claims that the results
of Sornette et al. are incorrect, as we have shown above. As a result, it is challenging to
weigh the value of one approach against the other, and in this regard, limits the pertinence
of the contribution by Scholtes et al.
Scholtes et al. submitted to and published their paper in the Journal Empirical Software
Engineering. First, one would expect that claims questioning the validity of the results
obtained by Sornette et al. should have been sent to the same journal (i.e., PlosOne), as
a comment or a follow-up paper to the editors. Second, it is rather surprising that the
editors and the reviewers of the Journal Empirical Software Engineering did not raise any
issue concerning the approach by Scholtes et al. to rebut the findings by Sornette et al.,
in particular given the many problems that we have highlighted above. Third, when the
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present authors attempted to send an earlier version of this manuscript [68] as a response
to the editor, they received the following response from the editors of the Journal Empiri-
cal Software Engineering: “the [...] journal does not publish any responses to articles. We
encourage you to expand the response to a full research paper, e.g., by repeating the exper-
iments, adding additional research questions, etc”. In other words, the editors barred the
possibility to react to Scholtes et al. in their journal, and they asked the present authors to
perform what they should have requested at first for the manuscript by Scholtes et al.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have carefully described the two methods and results by Sornette et al. [3] and
Scholtes et al. [4], and their apparent opposite results (i.e., the Aristotle vs. Ringelmann
effects), with emphasis on their commonalities and differences. Despite claiming that the
results by Sornette et al. do not hold, Scholtes et al did not use the same data (made available
by Sornette et al. following open access standards), they used a totally different methodology
(based on averages) that does not allow a direct testing of the methods and results by
Sornette et al. (designed to be able to quantify bursty dynamics and large deviations).
However compelling and probably valid in its own way, the method followed by Scholtes et al.
does not help directly invalidate the results and theory by Sornette et al. We believe there is
much room for the Aristotle vs. Ringelmann debate, and we are glad that Scholtes et al. took
upon the challenge. Our conclusion is that Sornette et al.’s results hold for no more than 30-
50 contributors working simultaneously, while Scholtes et al.’s results may apply for larger
projects. Yet, we believe that proceeding in a way that follows good practices regarding
open and reproducible science, as well as using a more standard publication channel for
their challenge, would have helped developing a much more data grounded, constructive
and serene debate.
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